HENRI BERGSON has been the genius of philosophy in our time. H e had an original vision of life and existence, and communicated it with such line art that it became a considerable ingredient of the general philosophy of the age. His own work is thus a case of "the miracle of artistic creation" which he described in his last book: "A work of genius which begins by disconcerting people 'will create, little by little, simply by its very presence, a conception of its art and an artistic atmosphere that will allow of represented as an anti-intel lectual. Yet his art and his wise patience brought hi~ recognition. They disclosed a mind richly appreciative and intent only upon a constructive philosophy. No one, moreover, could have been more of an example of the glory of intellect than Bergson. H is writings abound in keen, su btle, penetrating analysis ; they exhibit, too, a speculative daring that has -not been seen since Hegel, or perhaps even since the great masters of the seventee~th century. Yet it is also true that these intellectual powers were not the chief or distinctive quality of his mind. He had, besides, the poetic gift of intuitive, creative ge. nius.
It is more than fifty years since Henri Bergson, then not quite thirty, wrote the preface of his first book,2 known in English under the title of Time and Free Will (February, 1888) . A retrospect that reaches so far in the past affords us abundant opportunity to appreciate Bergson's accomplishment during his long and mature life as a philoso pher.
We look, then, on the intellectual scene towards the end of the nineteenth century. The prevailing philosophy was dogmatically sure of an unswerving progress of science along its existing lines.
Inspired by the magnificent advances in physical science, those philosophers had great confidence in themselves and in their particular interpretation of Nature. They measured all other kinds of knowledge by that physical model. Naturally, then, the sciences or animate Nature were deemed to be on the certain road to truth only when they followed mechanistic principles. Of course, hi story, the knowledge of man and society, and the "moral sciences" had an interminably long way to go before they would even be on the mere path to knowledge. As for metaphysics, that was absolutely impossible, for it went clean .beyond the realm of fact altogether, beyond all empirical or historical evidence, into sheer vagaries of thought. Philosophical speculation seemed a mere survival of an outdated theological phase of human culture.
Such a philosophy of knowledge involved a characteristic view of reality. Physical Nature was the sum and substance of aU that exists, the very limit of experience and kn owledge-there was nothing more, nothing "beyond" it. Nature was of universal extension, self-contained, and determined through and through according to laws of causal necessity . Thus all beings, animate and inanimate, social and conscious beings, all were alike subject to the materialistic determinism of a "closed Universe." Protests had been made against this vie w of man and existence, protests from those who had a broader and longer view of the history of culture and who saw the philosophy of the momen t in perspective. They remembered that the spirit of the modern world had found expression in several cen turies of struggle for religious a:nd political freedom, of whose results the nineteenth century was the heir, one of the very heritages being the freedom to make scientific inquiry . . They felt a lingering respect, too, for those philosophers of the earlier period, for whom science had been a great inspi ration but who had, nevertheless, devoted their own thought to the vindication of human freedom and the beliefs of men in God and immortality. Yet this hi storical wisdom was regarded in general with little favour, as only looking backward, ff back to Kant/' not forward, to so mething modern. ' To be in tune with the age one had to fall in with the contemporary fait h in progress. The only thing o'ne could do, then, was to pay homage with everyone else to the magnificent new structure of physical science with its advances in knowledge and its practical improvements in human civilization.
The recently-heralded theory of the evolution of living species was something of a problem for that philosophy. The idea of evolution was not the offspring of physical science. It came down from another tradition, that of natural history. And the question of origins was someth ing of an historical quest ion, not unlike those asked by thinkers when they were trying to account for the forms of law and political constitutions that h ad seemed to earlier generat ions absolute and eternal, divinely ordained. So the living species had seemed, too, fixed, eternal forms, but men like Diderot and Buffon had wondered whether these forms had not likewise had a history and such speculations went down through the li terature o f natural hi story. Darwin gave the conjectures the status of a well-founded theory when he brought forward conclusive evidence of the process of natural selection, showing how chance variations might, in time, be made the distinct species now known. Here were facts and a theory to stimulate a fresh interpretation of Nature. H ere, however, it was the scientific philosophers who looked backward. They forced the Darwinian view into a pre-ordained mechanistic system. They read the events of evolutionary history in terms of causal necessity: the adaptation to the environment was necessary for survival in the struggle for existence. No independent motive was attributed to t he nature of the organism. Nor was the possibility entertained, except perhaps by the discredited Lamarck, that the living creature might be making its own way in life or taking a direction that was not determined by the necessities o f the case. The so-called "chance" variations were not a real chance for the organism but merel y "accident," which would some day be explained in terms of t he laws of heredity. Counting in such hopeful expectations, the mechanical explanation seemed quite sufficient without need of any fur t her study of the nature of life or its history. And man himself, his mind, his social modes of life, his morality, art, religion, all of human life was brought down into this scheme, and the evolution of man was spoken of as "the descent of man." And enthusiasts like Herbert Spencer made evolution apply to the whole universe, deriving life itself from the primordial physical matter. Thus was the new-born science of biology hurriedly gathered into the fold of philosophic materialism which had gained another conquest and pressed all the harder on men's beliefs in the freed om and the reality of the spirit.
Bergson began his work ill that general atmosphere. The philosophy of the day was called "positivi sm," professing only to believe in fact establi shed by scienti fi c method and proof. There was a profound agnosticism, too, whose sem blance of mo desty was 'belied by its conceit of kn owledge, for by agnosticism the philosophers meant that they did not kno w anything about the ultimates ' of other people, t hose who spoke of the soul" free will and God, but they were quite sure of their own ultimates, the matter and motion of the physical world. They seemed to have little suspicion that the very progress of science itself might disclose a new concept of Nature and even new methods of science.
.
Duri ng the fifty years that have passed si nce Bergson published his first book all these things have changed . I n science itself it is now a duty to proceed critically, with conscious attention to one's concepts and principles. There is even perhaps an over-abundance of speculation in the philosophy of science. Meanwhile, matter has been dethron ed from its absolute sovereignty. The idea of mechan ism is discreetly applied with a careful regard for the nature of the su bject-matter. The notion of an iron-clad rule of causation has been chased out of its native domain in physics and so houn'ded about elsewhere that it is now worn to a spectral shade that cannot even scare the supersti ti ous-and the idea of necessity is about where Hume left it two hundred years ago. Freedom has been given carle blanche. It is even disporting itself in the guise of "indeterminism." It plays a mon~ sober and useful role in the methods of knowledge where it is seen in the choice of postulates. And the freedom that is conceded to the mind in its activities of knowing is granted also to the moral and religi ous life. With the appreciation of human freedom has come that of individuality and a recognition of the boundless variety of the real. The world is now conceived to be a structure of many mansions each one of which is built according to the law of its own grade and style, and it is not expected that they are all constructed in the mechanical fashi on. The "higher" realms are not explained by being reduced to the . simpler and less significant, on which they are reared. The Greek conception has been recaptured in our thinking, the idea that the nature of anything is best understood by the highest form or fulfilment of it. So the attention of man is now on the free aspirations of life, n'lt on its roots in the ground. This way of looking at existence has, in turn, affected the idea of evolution which is taken to be not a descent from some primordial matter but rather as a move forward into new and more diverse and signi ficant being, and consequently evolution is characterized as being either "creative ll or "emergent." Thus in this ha1f-eentury a great transformation has taken place in the attitude and point of view of men as regards those matters which were so dogmatically regarded in the nineteenth century. , Bergson contributed greatly, more than any other, to this whole . change of atmosphere. He contributed, that is to say, along with others, for the general thought of any age is the outcome of many individual efforts in all the different spheres of life. Thus the physical sciences themselves moved on to new ground from the inherent vitality of science itself. The question of "science and hypothesis" was one for the internal logic of science, although the reason why men inquired into it may have been their extra-scientific concern for human freedom . The liberal aspirations of the age were expressed, too, in the literature of the day and these thoughts fed the stream of philosophy and gave it greater volume and spread. But Bergson was the creative impulse of this whole surge of interest and activity. He took the initiative. He aiscerned the point of departure for . the new movement. He pointed to the importance of Time throughout the whole region of human experience, in personal life, in evolution, and even in the world of physics. He was the first to make T ime central for modern philosophy. His subtle, brilliant, true analysis of consciousness won him the joyous and hearty support of William James, who was ' taking a similar step of emancipation from mechan istic psychology. And Bergson was also the first to construe the process of evolution as one wherein novelty came to birth in time, despite the logical prohibition of the ancient maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit . H e was the first to attempt a metaphysics of the creative process throughout the whole of existence,-creativity envisaged in man, life, the entire Universe. Having set a strong current of thought along these lines Bergson dre:w the: minds of others into it, and these in turn made their own individual criticisms and adventures of thought.
Examples from the English-speaking world alone are-besides William James-John Dewey, Samuel Alexander, and A. N. Whitehead. a In many lands, however, men were · exploring the new meaning of time in life and existence, in Nature and even beyond Nature. In consequence the idea of an ultimate timeless Substance in any form has largely disappeared from present-day philosophy. Reality itself is conceived as a temporal or historical process, or at least as having an essentially temporal character. Time has become the common subject of our philosophy, and is always central in it. That Bergson was so prescient and instrumental in bringing this about is his chief title to genius.
A closer view of details will show not only the historical role of Bergson's philosophy, but also its continued significance for contemporary thinking.
That philosophy began with a clearly-drawn distinction between out its meaning. An analogy is the hearing of a melod y. The quality of each individual note is not to be located simply in its physical sound with its particular pitch and timbre, for how that note sounds and what it means depends upon t he other notes with which it is organized into a melody; its very quality of tone) its intensity, its musical and emotional significance come from its relation ship to the other notes and to the whole. 1n consciousness generally, there is an organization and solidarity between the states of consciousness which always yields an enduring continuity and ties of relationship. One tie th at is ineluctable is the tie of the past with the present and the anticipated future) (or states of consciousness come and go' and have their t emporal meaning in a Uduration" which is always within consciousness itself. The external t ime with which we reckon, in the spatial world of succession, is somethin g utterly incommensurate with this inner reality of "duration" as we experience it in conscious Ji£e. 4 This conception of consciousness enabled Bergson to state his case for free will. Just as anyone state of consciousness is what it is by virtue of its relations with others and the whole, so in the case of desires or motives it is the whole personality which is reRected in each motive and which confers upon it its effective moving power. Morality and Religion (1932) .
Bergson had revived an important insight of Descartes when he wrote that "there is no point of contact at all between the unextended and the extended, between quality and quantity," that is to say, between enduring conscious existence and physical being.
Descartes, it is true, had hastened > to crystallize the two modes of being into absolute, ultimate "substances." This effectively prevented their being confused, but it also condemned them to a sterile isolation from each other. The problem of early philosophy had been to explain their "union" or working relationship in some way without violating the original dualism. Descartes himself had put the substances into a causal interaction with each other and was thereby committed to materialism, since he construed the relation between the metaphysical substances to be of the same sort as that holding for things of the physical order alone. Other knowledge. He started a constructive metaphysics which would not have to confess at the start that it was debarred from the knowledge of whatever is beyond physics. Thus modern philosophy was to recover its original speculative elan . Whether or not contemporary philosophers follow Bergson farther into hi s metaphysics, they have at least become more appreciative of the fundamental distinction between the conscious and the physical modes of being. Some regard it as the part of wisdom to begin with such a duality and thence work out a constructive philosophy.'
In searching out the reali ty of "duration" Bergson had no intention of neglecting the physical real. Indeed an appreciation of matter is essential to his position. To distinguish conscious life and material being throughout the realm of experience is actually to maintain everywhere the reality of both. with which we are so inordinately preoccupied for the sake of our physical survival? In putting this question he had by implication turned away from the religious solution of a spiritual revelation.-He wanted an answer in terms of purely human powerJ. Wh~t is it in us that knows duration, consciousness, life, action, creativity?
His eventual answer-which cannot be understood apart from the total view of evolution to be developed-is "intuition." For besides intellect the mind of man is endowed with intuition, and both are necessary to Hthe integral vision" of existence. In philosophy today few, perhaps, will follow Bergso n and have recourse to this supplementary intuition. Some will attribute to human which transcend experience and Nature. a Others accept the utilitarian function of intelligence and formulate a completely instrumental philosophy of kn owledge and existence, content to stay within experience and Nature. lo Bergson went on into metaphysics, to interpret the duality of consciousness and extension. How are life and matter to be understood, in their "solidarity"? H ow are the two distinct modes of being related? According to the older metaphysics the answer would be: these two forms belong to One' Being, called N atuTe or God, whose rationale determines t he correspondent changes of state in them. But this conception, supremely represented in the philosophy of Spinoz3) was precisely the view of the si tuation from which Bergson had departed at the outset of his thinking. l1 For conscious life is here made to march along a pre-determined route of space; real change, freedom, creation is swallowed up in an all-inclusive timeless substance, so that there is no real time nor genuine liberty. The unit y sought for could never be that of a su bstance consuming both the modes of bei ng.
Evolution suggested the true interpretation of the duali ty. Evolution is a process wherein different forms of life branch out as divergent lines ; plants and animals, invertebrates and vertebrates, and various species in each kind, and varieties in each speciesa process always tending toward ind ividuality. The forms diverge but are not absolutely separated . An identity of functi on is often to be seen in the different forms that have developed their distinct structures along different routes of adaptation to their respective environments. D espite the specialized characters of each form, too, something of the specific character of other types and forms persists to a degree in each, like ~ memory in all of wh a tever has 'See Norman Kemp Smith, P roltgomena 10 an Idtalist Theory oj Know/edlt (1924), pp. 10-15, 141-.3, 182, 192-4, and 229-37 . Professor Kemp Smith uses " intuition" to characterize the space-time appreh ension as a whole and gives no preference to time or duration. in this respect agneing wi th SQmuei Alexander (op. t ;I.). cr. W. E. Hocking, Thoughts on Lift and Death (1936),. pp. 151, 154. ltJohn Dewey. Exptrienu and Nalure (1925) , and "Nature in Experience" (Phi/osophital R t oitw, March, 1940) .
. llBergson conducted an advanced seminar on Spinoza early in the year 19 14 at the College de France. The sight of the protagonist of Time or Duration going through with Bymparh y and profound understanding the intellectua l world of Spinoza reminded one of Dante the modern mnn presenting so perfectly the medieval world-view in hi s Dil)jne Comtdy. been tried anywhere by the life-principle. Hence it is only by noting the general tendency, and not by somt unique fixed trait, that we can distinguish a particular species. T hus the evolution of life appears to be a unitary process which moues towards diversity, individuality, and novelty. Consequently there could never be any gathering of the rich variety of forms of life into one final Being or Substance: the unity lies behind, or rather, in the continuing impulse of crtalion. Thus Bergson was able to conceive of a way by which diverse forms might be related to each other in one scheme. Bu t the great task still remained: how relate the physical of thought or creation , and, absorbed in that, we are oblivious of "the body)" as we say; there is the other experience, as we relapse from effort and concentration, when we look on our thoughts as things external, as ideas pass meaninglessly across the mind in a dream, and then we exist in an extended world of body. Or con-· sider the revealing principle of the physical world itself, in the "law of entropy," which points to a direction of physical change in Nature, a tendency towards a s tate where no energy will be available for any action, which is precisely the opposite of the process of life. These o bservations and experiences were hints toward a solution. Bergson then ventured on one of the most daring flights of imagination in modern philosophy when he depicted the "genesis of matter": the enduring impulse of life was conceived to turn back on itself, or move in the inverse direction of evolution; and thus extend in space and generate matter.
This creation is not, however, like the /lfirst crea'tion" of God,
-according to the older philosophy, where everything is all made at oncc. Creation is an evolutionary process and takes ' time. The living impulse materializes itself and then works ahead, through the organizations which it has created, to new (arms. But it can never dispense with bodies and material existence, although it always acts as if it were doing its best not only to use matter but also to free itself of the laws that hold for matter. And suddenly Bergson speaks of God, in terms of this Man oital: "God has -nothing about H im that is all-made: He is life incessant, action, liberty ."a Thus, while retaining always the duality of "the unextended" and "extended," Bergson finally attributes the greater significance to life and duration as the more direct manifes tation of the dynamic, creative impulse. Similarly, while human existen ce must always be bodily as well as mental, it is the active consciousness of man that is the more worthy form. And further, preference among the conscious activities is given to intuition over intellect: CIA complete and perfect humanity would be that where these two forms were to a'ttain to their full development . .. , but intuition is the' spirit itself, and in a certain sense, life itself; the -intellect cuts itself off by a process that imitates that which has produced matter. Thus we see th e unity of the mental life. We can recognize it only by placing ourselves in the intuition and going then ce to the intellect, for we shall never get to intuition by way of the intellect." The sum of it all is: "Philosophy thus introduces us into the spiritual life. " 13 The duality appears again in the last work of Bergson on the H two sources" of morality and religion. u This book reckons with a great body of sociological knowledge concerning human existence. I t distinguishes first the moral ity relative to social groups, the morality of obligation, with its limited humanity that does not forbid but even requires the making of war on those of other groups. Such morality is necessary in order to preserve the ICclose before and after and thus see uncertainty and know fear and hope and threats to his existence. Yet this is but religion in the static form, where its function is to s tabili ze life in society as it is. The form that is truly expressive of the creative energy of life is the individual, mystical religion, 'especially that of the Christian mystics . And Bergson developed this theme along with many other themes of wi sdom in this immense final work. For him it was a conclusion; but to others it was a call, that they should continue with a farther exploration of freedom and the spirit, and the knowledge of man in society, and the meaning of time and history and the acts of the heroes and mystics.
Some contemporary philosophers have had the sympathy to understand such a call to explore the spirit, and they have responded, for their part, in their own individual ways, as they ought to do if Sergson is right about the mystery of time and creation.
I '
But the appeal is to all the men of the age . It is a call to decision, action, heroism. He himself gave the example. It is said that Bergson, who was a Jew, had become a Christian in his later days, without making the fact public, and that after the invasion of France he remained at Paris and refused to avail himself of any exemption from the sufferings and restrictions to which those of his former faith were subjected." He died a brave captive. For those who have been troubled about the materialism of modern civilization the last challenging words of his Two Sources of Morality and Religion may be quoted: "Humanity groans, half-crushed under the burden of the progress that has been made. Men are not sufficiently aware that their own future depends on themselves.
It is for them to see lirst of all if they want to continue to live. Then they must ask themselves if it is merely life they want or whether they will make the necessary elfort, besides, to bring to accomplishment, even on our refractory planet, the essential function of the Universe which is a machine for the making of Gods." 
